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Shakespeare on the brain, Vivaldi on the weather, and
Darwin on docu-soap?
The Bard on the Brain: Understanding the Mind Through the Art of Shakespeare and the Science of Brain Imaging by
Paul M. Matthews and Jeffrey McQuain, University of Chicago Press, 2003. £21.99/$35.00 (192 pages) ISBN 0 97238 302 6
Beatrice de Gelder and Nouchine Hadjikhani
MGH-NMR Center, Harvard Medical School, Charlestown, Boston, MA 02119, USA
Like all great artists Shakespeare is
universally credited with deep and
eternal insights into the human soul.
In The Bard on the Brain, Paul Mat-
thews, a neurologist and director of the
Oxford Centre for Functional Magnetic
Imaging of the Brain, and Jeffrey
McQuain, an author and researcher in literary studies
have taken up the challenge to show how many of those
insights are already substantiated by research in cognitive
neuroscience using the recent technology allowing in vivo
observation of brain activity.
Materials selected are grouped around seven themes
with chapters like ‘Minds and Brains’, ‘Decision and
Action’, ‘Our Inner World’, and ‘Drugs and the Brain’. In
each chapter the same recipe is used to obtain a colourful
cocktail. Presentation consists of some initial introductory
lines, followed by famous excerpts from well-known plays
of the Bard and a selection of photographs showing actors
at crucial turns in the dialogue together with artistic
rendering of brain maps. Following the quotes are small
essays of varying quality that try to build bridges between
Shakespeare’s words and the images of brain activation.
The selection of Chapter topics is naturally quite
predictable, as the leading theme is the human condition.
Similarly, the choice of passages quoted from each of the
plays is in most cases not altogether that surprising.
Unfortunately, in many cases the links are quite artificial
and clumsy, and contain numerous clichés. In other cases
the effort to present brain imaging on, say, bilingualism,
numerical cognition, or language and semantics, over-
stretches the reader’s imagination, because a direct rela-
tion to the big themes perceived in Shakespeare’s plays –
life, love, the passing of time and death – is certainly less
than obvious.
Taking Shakespeare’s work as the leading thread to
explore the different themes that have been studied by
20th century neuroscientists is certainly an interesting
approach, but a more thorough method than used here
might have lead to something more interesting for readers
at different levels. After having had a pleasant look
through this book, we still wonder whether the attempt
to try to bring arts and science closer together is really
something that needs to be pursued. Nothing new really
emerges from this side-by-side comparison; lovers of
Shakespeare’s work will not feel as though they gained
new insights into his work, and scientists will not find any
new useful information.
In a book that is devoted in part to ‘the Science of Brain
Imaging’ one would have hoped that the imaging tech-
niques used to produce the illustrations of brain activation
would be better introduced. Many of the figures were
rendered in a way that might make them look better to
some but also makes them very difficult to read and
interpret. Moreover, a blatant mistake such as that in the
caption of Figure 9, where what actually represents dif-
ferent visual areas is described as being brain activations
for the left or the right visual field, is quite surprising.
Having looked at these images, the naı̈ve reader could
be left with the impression that these nice colored areas on
the brain actually correspond to something to do with what
Shakespeare says about the complexity and the subtlety
of the human psyche. This would be more than a little
misleading – we are actually a long way from this level
of understanding in neuroscience, even if the progress
towards it during the past decade has been amazing. Of
course, there is an inherent danger of oversimplification
in any book that tries to be accessible to a broad public.
But the problems here run deeper. In fact, they are well
enshrined in the title – was Shakespeare really interested
in the brain? Or was it the mind he was after and was the
brain a metaphor for the mind in Shakespeare’s days, as
it is in the present? This mind/brain confusion is quite
apparent in some of the brain research quoted and the
Shakespearean context in which it is presented here.
As much as the authors state that we are at the dawn
of a new Enlightenment, it is not clear what the second
Enlightenment is going to be about. The seamless tran-
sition from ‘mind talk’ to ‘brain talk’ brain opens up a
gigantic can of worms that have neither been eradicated
not metamorphosed into butterflies by the new brain
imaging methods. In any event, the Bard did not say
anything about the brain – his talk was all about the mind.
Mind and brain can be used as synonyms of course, but
does that mean any more in Shakespeare’s day than it does
now, other than that the brain is a metaphor for the mind?
None of this casts doubt on the impressive achieve-
ments of a decade of brain imaging research. An instruc-
tive comparison can be made with research on vision.
There is no doubt that vision scientists have thrown light
on some of the techniques used by painters and there is
no denying that such research is much needed and very
useful. But clarifying the perceptual basis of painting
techniques and viewing a painting are two very differentCorresponding author: Beatrice de Gelder (degelder@nmr.mgh.harvard.edu).
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things. In the same sense Shakespeare is just as little
about the brain as Vivaldi’s Four Seasons is about the
weather, as Malevich reveals about the spiritual depths
of the Russian soul, or as Darwin contains scripts for
docu-soaps.
In the end, what strikes us is that, in this book,
Shakespeare’s message is read for its factual meaning,
that the metaphors are decoded as containing early
sketches of knowledge awaiting long overdue confirmation
from brain researchers. Surely it is hard to ignore that
Shakespeare the playwright did not write these plays just
to be read. Plays are conceived to be performed by actors
and to be seen, heard and felt by an audience. Plays are not
treatises on the soul, but scenarios for enacting emotions
and for communicating with an audience in a theatre. The
scenarios only come to life when embodied by actors and
watched by agents. The book misses out on this aspect.
But this is not to say that these aren’t matters than
can and will be taken up by scientists soon! In fact, one
can easily imagine a brain imaging study in which the
participants hear and see fragments of plays reprinted
here. In that case, the next edition of this book would
be accompanied with an interactive DVD that allows
us to watch the play while seeing brain scans of
participants’ brain activity.
1364-6613/$ - see front matter q 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.09.011
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Weighing up the facts of category-specific semantic
deficits
Helen E. Moss and Lorraine K. Tyler
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK
Caramazza and Mahon [1] discuss competing theoretical
accounts of the organization of conceptual knowledge, in
the light of evidence from patients with category-specific
semantic deficits. They conclude that their ‘Domain-
Specific’ hypothesis, in which evolutionary factors have
resulted in specialized neural systems for concepts in a
limited set of domains, namely animals, fruit and
vegetables, conspecifics, and tools, is the only one that is
consistent with the ‘facts’ of category-specific deficits.
Although we agree that there are many problems for
alternative theories and that none provides a complete
account of the data, we wish to highlight a fact that is not
mentioned by Caramazza and Mahon, but which presents
a challenge to the Domain-Specific hypothesis [2,3].
The fact in question is that most patients with category-
specific semantic deficits show a graded impairment
rather than an all-or-none dissociation. That is, few
patients are within the normal range for their ‘preserved’
category across all semantic tasks on which they are
tested. In support of this point, we cite just a few
illustrative cases – patients ‘JBR’ [4], ‘Michelangelo’ [5]
and ‘RC’ [6] – but there are many more. The few cases for
whom performance is consistently within the normal
range for the preserved category – for example, ‘EW’ [7]
– are the exception rather than the rule. How would
graded impairments arise from a lesion to a distinct,
dedicated neural system for a specific category or domain?
One possibility is that the neural circuits are close together
in the brain, so that large and/or diffuse lesions affect more
than one system, but to differing degrees. However, this
argument remains untestable unless precise claims are
made about the neuro-anatomical correlates of the
proposed domain specific systems. Although the lesion
data show some broad correlations between bilateral
antero-medial and inferior temporal lobe damage and
living things deficits, there is much variation in the extent
and location of lesions and the degree of impairment in
‘preserved categories’. For example, patient ‘EW’ [7] has a
highly selective deficit for animals – which we might
expect to be associated with a small focal inferior temporal
lobe lesion – yet she has a large area of encephlomalacia
within the left posterior frontal and parietal lobes.
Extensive fronto-parietal lesions are more commonly
associated with artifact deficits.
A related point concerns the nature of dissociations in
neural activity produced by concepts in different domains
as revealed in functional imaging studies. Caramazza and
Mahon cite evidence for category- or domain-specific
activations in a number of imaging studies as further
support for the Domain-Specific account. However, the
regions of interest are rarely selectively recruited by a
specific domain or category; rather, different categories
produce activation across many of the same regions, but to
different degrees [8]. Rather than separate systems
dedicated to individual domains, this suggests that
concepts within different domains place more or fewer
processing demands on different elements within a single
system [9]. A possible reply to this point is that the domain-
specific neural system should be interpreted as arising
from a network of connections within pools of neurons that
are common to the processing of many domains, but then it
is difficult to see how this differs from a unitary system in
which category structure emerges as a function of overlap
and correlation within concepts.Corresponding author: Helen E. Moss (hem10@cam.ac.uk).
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